This blog has been submitted by Duncan Green. It is a reblog originally posted on: From Poverty to Power.
They’re funny things, speaker tours.
On the face of it, you go from venue to venue, churning out the same
presentation – more wonk-n-roll than rock-n-roll. But you are also testing your
arguments, adding slides where there are holes, deleting ones that don’t work.
Before long the talk has morphed into something very different.
So where did I end up after my most recent attempt to
promote FP2P in the US and Canada? The basic talk is still ‘What’s Hot and
What’s Not in Development’ – the title I’ve used in UK, India,
South Africa etc. But the content has evolved. In particular, the question of
complex systems provoked by far the most discussion.
I started off with the infamous US military mindmap of
Afghanistan. Although ridiculed at the time, the map looks like a genuine and
nuanced effort to understand the country and is probably fairly typical of the
complexity of power and relationships in any given country. The point is that
such a system is complex, not complicated. Complicated means if you study it
hard, you can predict what happens when you intervene. In contrast a complex
system has so many feedback loops and uncertainties that you can never know how
it will react to a stimulus (say $100m in aid, or an invasion….).
The crucial point is that most political, social and
economic systems look like the map. Yet the aid business insists on pursuing a
linear model of change, either explicitly, or implicitly because a ‘good’
funding application has a clear set of activities, outputs, outcomes and a MEL system that can attribute any change to the
project’s activities – a highly linear approach. Other organizations – say
forest fire managers, or the military, seem more able to cope with complexity,
although I found out from a woman in one seminar who had served in Afghanistan
that the power map was actually drawn up by a consultant, who was promptly
sacked after showing the slide to General Petraeus, so
maybe the soldiers aren’t so comfortable with complexity after all.
In denying complexity is obliged either to seek islands
of linearity in a complex system (vaccines, bed nets), which may not always be
the most useful or effective places to engage, or to lie – writing up project
reports to turn the experience of ‘making it up as you go along’ that
epitomises working in complex systems into the magical world of linear project
implementation, ‘roll out’, ‘best practice’ and all the rest. That not only
wastes a lot of staff time and energy, it also reduces the ability to learn
about how to work best in complex systems.
So how should the aid system change? Overall, we need to
think though ‘How to plan when you don’t know what is going to happen’ (my best
effort at explaining complexity without resorting to jargon). Here are my
bullet points, and brief explanations:
Fast feedback: if you don’t know what is going to
happen, you have to detect changes in real time, but also have the institutions
to respond to thatinformation (as was not the case recently in the Sahel).
Focus on problems, not solutions: Drawing on Matt Andrews’ work,
the role of outsiders is to identify and amplify problems, but leave the search
for solutions to local institutions. (At the World Bank, Shanta Devarajanpointed
out the contradiction between this approach and NGOs’ preference for big,
simple solutions – end land grabs, no to user fees. Ouch.)
Rules of thumb, not best practice
toolkits: I am told
that the US marines do not go into combat brandishing Oxfam toolkits and online
resources on best practice. They operate on rules of thumb – take the high
ground, stay in communications and keep moving. They improvise the rest. Aid
workers on the ground operate far more like this than our project reports
admit. If we were honest about it, we could have a better discussion on how to improve
those rules of thumb.
Some possible approaches that spring to mind (and I would
love to hear examples of others)
Work on the ‘enabling environment’ rather than
specific projects: things like norms, rights or access to information
Evolutionary/Venture Capitalist
approach: run multiple
experiments and then zero in on what seems to be working best. Example, the Chukua Hatua project in Tanzania
Convening and Brokering: Get dissimilar local players together
to find solutions – the outsiders’ job is to support that search, not do it
themselves. Example, the TAJWSS water project in Tajikistan
But any attempt to move in this direction raises some fundamental
challenges to the current structures of the aid industry:
Results for grown ups: The current approach to measuring
results favours linearity. But rejecting results altogether is the wrong
approach – both because even
those who recognize the central role of complex systems still want to know if
they’re doing any good, and because the results people control the cash. No
results, no funding. We need to get much better at ‘counting what counts’, and
reclaim the idea of ‘rigour’ for qualitative and other methods better suited to
complex systems.
Who to employ? Risk-taking, entrepreneurial,
maverick searcher types have a hard time in an aid business dominated by
bureaucratic procedures and risk aversion. Moreover, working in complex systems
requires deep local knowledge of formal and informal power maps, something
expats on a two or three year posting are unlikely to acquire. How do we turn
the tables to attract and retain searchers, and value locally embedded knowledge?
Short Term v Long Term: Funding and project cycles are
short term, change in complex systems is often long term. How can we bridge the
gap, for example by combining good, plausible stories about the short term,
with more rigorous impact assessment in the long term (how often do we go back
and study the effects of an intervention 10 or 20 years after the funding has
ended?)
How to keep/build political
support given
that working in complex systems means acknowledging a lack of control over what
takes place and limits to attribution (no you can’t ‘badge’ the Arab Spring as
created by Oxfam, USAID or anyone else, sorry). It also means greater tolerance
of failure – a venture capitalist approach means accepting 9 failed start-ups
for every 1 big success, but imagine what aid critics would do with a 90%
failure rate. And how do we communicate and sell this approach to the public
after systematically dumbing down the aid and development story for decades?
(From buy a goat and save the world, to a post-goat narrative….)
Ben Ramalingam has been thinking about this for
years, and writing about it on his Aid on the Edge of Chaos blog. His book of the same name is due
out later this year, so let’s hope it can settle a lot of these issues (and
doubtless raise many more).
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